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the final arbiters of professional conduct for members of the bar in
Maryland, then it is the courts who must actively seek to aid lawyers in
defining proper ethical conduct where the code or case law has been
vague or silent. Failure to do so leaves at best no guidelines for those
concerned practitioners faced with a similar ethical situation, and, at
worst, a temptation for others to exceed proper bounds of professional
conduct. State v. Mahoney represented an opportunity lost for such
guidance.
Richard S. Miller
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-AUTOMOBILE
SEARCH ON POLICE LOT HELD VALID DUE TO EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES. SKINNER V. STATE, 16 Md. App. 116, 293 A.2d
828 (1972).
In Skinner v. State,' the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
upheld a conviction for receipt of stolen goods and possession of heroin
and controlled paraphernalia.2 The defendant was discovered in an
attempt to cash a stolen check at a bank, and thereafter fled to a
waiting car. A description of the defendant and the car was reported to
the police, who relayed it to a patrol unit, which in turn stopped the
defendant's car in an apartment parking lot.
After locking his car, the suspect was taken to the police station, and
his car was towed to headquarters where officers secured a warrant
authorizing its search. In dealing with the constitutionality of the
search of the car in the police garage, the Skinner court stated:
The search is constitutionally unassailable. With scrupulous
regard for their suspect's 4th Amendment protections, the
[police] did more than they were required to do. Their effort,
in terms of its constitutionality, is like Portia's quality of
mercy, "twice blest."
.... [A]t the moment when [one of the officers] saw the
[defendant's] automobile pull onto the parking lot ... he...
had probable cause to believe that the automobile contained
fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime. We are further
satisfied that the exigency of the situation would have justified
an immediate warrantless search of the automobile there upon
that parking lot.
3
1. 16 Md. App. 116, 293 A.2d 828 (1972).
2. This note will not deal with the exception to a search warrant due to a bona fide inventory
search. A jury verdict of statutory common nuisance, also not dealt with in this note, was
reversed. Skinner v. State, 16 Md. App. 116, 293 A.2d 828 (1972).
3. 16 Md. App. at 118-19, 293 A.2d at 830-31 (1972).
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The search conducted after the warrant had been obtained uncovered
the evidence leading to the convictions on the narcotics charges. In this
appeal the defendant contended that the warrantless seizure of the
automobile prior to the issuance of the search warrant tainted the
entire proceeding. The Skinner court held that there was probable cause
for the seizure of the car and that:
It is quite clear that since the police could have searched the
automobile without a warrant in the first instance or could have
seized it without a warrant and removed it to the police garage
for a subsequent warrantless search in the second instance, the
justification for the mere seizure not followed by a warrantless
search is subsumed within the larger justification. The search of
the [defendant's] automobile was constitutional ... because of
the combination of probable cause and exigent circumstances,
even absent a warrant.
4
The operative principle in the case at hand, as well as the key to the
continuing controversy in this particular province of search and seizure
law, finds its embodiment in this statement by the court, and an
analysis as to its validity in the context of prior related holdings is
essential to an evaluation of Skinner's significance.
The first Supreme Court case which set forth the so-called
automobile exception to the necessity of a search warrant under the
fourth amendment was Carroll v. United States,' where prohibited
liquor was found in the defendant's car.6 The Court rejected the theory
that the mere discovery of contraband would justify a prior warrantless
search,7 but based the validity of the search on the mobile nature of
the place to be searched:
[TIhe guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures... has been construed.., as recognizing a necessary
difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily
may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or
automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.'
4. Id. at 121, 293 A.2d at 832 (emphasis added).
5. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
6. In Carroll there was no prior arrest to justify the warrantless search of the defendant's car,
although officers had probable cause (through information given by an undercover agent)
to make an initial stop of the vehicle.
7. 267 U.S. 132, 141 (1925).
8. Id. at 153.
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While the Carroll Court did require the existence of probable cause to
validate such warrantless searches, the mobility rationale above served
as the basis for what was later to be verbalized as "exigent
circumstances."
It was not until 1964 that the Court found it necessary to pull in the
reins on the Carroll decision, in Preston v. United States.9 There, the
defendant was arrested (in his car) for vagrancy, and the car was later
impounded and searched without a warrant. Noting that there was no
connection between the crime and the necessity for a search at the
station, the Court declared that the search was too remote in time and
place to be validly considered incident to the arrest. In discussing the
exigency of the situation, the Court said:
[T]he police had the right to search the car when they first
came on the scene. But this does not decide the question of the
reasonableness of a search at a later time and at another
place.... At this point [when the car was in the police garage]
there was no danger that any of the men arrested could have
used any weapons in the car or could have destroyed any
evidence of a crime ..... 0
The Skinner case resembles Preston in so far as the inculpatory
evidence found in both cases was unrelated to the crime for which the
defendant in each was arrested; however, the cases are distinguishable in
that the crime of vagrancy does not inherently require any search for
evidence, while the crime of larceny of checks may require such a
search. Furthermore, as pointed out by the quotation above, the need
to prevent the destruction of evidence and to seize weapons connected
with a crime may provide a justification for a warrantless search at a
time later than the arrest. The Preston Court had little difficulty
holding that the warrantless search of an automobile in secure police
custody was unreasonable where the alleged crime was vagrancy.
The separation in time and place from the scene of the arrest was
later developed in Cooper v. California,"' where a warrantless search
was effected one week after the arrest of the defendant. Cooper's
vehicle was seized pursuant to a state statute which provided for the
holding as evidence of any vehicle used in connection with the sale or
possession of narcotics," 2 the crimes for which Cooper was arrested. In
upholding the warrantless search, Cooper easily distinguished Preston,
on the basis that the former "was closely related to the reason [the
defendant] was arrested, the reason his car had been impounded, and
the reason it was being retained."' ' Cooper further stated:
9. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
10. Id. at 367-68 (emphasis added).
11. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
12. Id. at 60. Thus, Cooper does not extend the Carroll doctrine that such searches could be
made only where there is probable cause to suspect contraband.
13. Id. at 61.
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The forfeiture of [the defendant's] car [as provided for in the
same statute that authorized its seizure] did not take place until
over four months after it was lawfully seized. It would not be
unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain the car in
their custody for such a length of time, had no right, even for
their own protection, to search it....
Our holding, of course, does not affect the State's power to
impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required
by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so.' 4
Through Skinner, Maryland is declining to impose such "higher
standards" on the police.
The facts in Skinner are in agreement with those in Cooper in regard
to the connection between the alleged crime and the search. In Skinner
the search of the automobile was related to the offense of larceny of
checks, although the products of the search were unrelated to the
crime. However, the justification for the search in Skinner was based on
a complex doctrine stemming from a line of cases that once again
returned to the concept of mobility as a basis for providing an
exception to the warrant requirement.' ' The key case in this group
that justified warrantless searches on grounds rooted in the concept of
mobility was Chambers v. Maroney.' 6
The defendant in Chambers was arrested with three other men in an
automobile which was stopped by police shortly after a robbery. As in
Skinner the car was taken to the police station where a 'warrantless
search revealed inculpatory evidence (guns from an earlier robbery).
Unlike the facts in Skinner (but in accord with the Skinner dictum' 7),
no search warrant was obtained for the search at the police station. The
Chambers Court held that the search was constitutional, not as
incident to the arrest of the defendant (too much time had elapsed be-
tween the arrest and the search), but under the automobile exception
set forth in Carroll.
The Chambers Court formally introduced the requirement of exigent
circumstances in these cases,' 8 which must now be combined with the
Carroll requirement of probable cause to justify this type of search.
However, the crux of the Chambers opinion is the extension of such
exigent circumstances that were present when the car was stopped for a
warrantless search on the road to a period a short time later, when the
car had been removed to a police garage. The Court reasoned that:
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's
judgment, only the immobilization of the car should be
14. Id. at 61-62.
15. See Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968), in which the Court returned to an
emphasis on mobility as a justification for the automobile exception.
16. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
17. 16 Md. App. at 118-19, 293 A.2d at 830-31 (1972).
18. 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
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permitted until a search warrant is obtained; arguably, only the
"lesser" intrusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes
the "greater." But which is the "greater" and which is the
"lesser" intrusion is itself a debatable question ..... .
By this reasoning Chambers resolved the question of what is the
"greater" intrusion into a defendant's rights under the fourth
amendment in favor of law enforcement officials. The Court did not
delve into the question of how much time the officials had at their
disposal to make this later intrusion.2 0 While the Chambers Court gave
at least lip service2 1 to the Trupiano requirement of securing a warrant
when practicable,2 2 it is certainly arguable that Chambers effectively
dispenses with the warrant requirement altogether.
To understand the Chambers rationale, extending the limits of a
warrantless search where exigent circumstances are present (thereby
encompassing the dictum in Skinner,2  the case of Coolidge v. New
Hampshire2 4 must be examined. There, a defendant was arrested in his
own home for murder; at the time of his arrest his car was parked in the
driveway of his home, from which it was towed to a police garage.
Vacuum sweepings from the car which were made over a year later
produced inculpatory evidence. Although the police had obtained a
warrant to search the defendant's automobile at the time of his arrest,
this warrant was later held to be invalid by the Court,25 thus requiring
the search at the police station to be viewed as a warrantless one.
The Coolidge Court examined the holdings of Carroll and Chambers
for the presence of exigent circumstances, distinguished these cases on
their facts, and held the search unconstitutional. Carroll was
distinguished because the facts of Coolidge indicated "no alerted
criminal bent on flight, no fleeting opportunity on an open highway
after a hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods or weapons, no
confederates waiting to move the evidence, not even the inconvenience
of a special police detail to guard the immobilized automobile.",2 6 All
19. Id. at 51.
20. In regard to allowing the police this discretion, Justice Douglas has said:
Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot
be trusted .... We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement (the fourth
amendment] and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those
who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the sit-
uation made the course imperative.
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
21. 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
22. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), stands for the proposition that a search
warrant must be obtained whenever possible under the circumstances of a given case;
however, this holding has been discarded by many courts. See Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 482 (1971).
23. 16 Md. App. at 118-19, 293 A.2d at 830-31 (1972).
24. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
25. Id. at 449.
26. Id. at 462.
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of these examples are presumably suggestive of exigent circumstances.
To explain how such exigent circumstances can be present in a police
garage, the Coolidge Court set forth its concept of how an automobile
may be "mobile":
In this case, it is, of course, true that even though Coolidge was
in jail, his wife was miles away in the company of two
plainclothesmen, and the Coolidge property was under the
guard of two other officers, the automobile was in a literal sense
"mobile." A person who had the keys and could slip by the
guard could drive it away. We attach no constitutional
significance to this sort of mobility.2
In view of the above language, it might seem that the Coolidge Court
would be opposed to any search conducted without a warrant once a
car is in custody at a police station. However, Coolidge would allow a
search following the rationale of Chambers, "that given a justified
initial intrusion, there is little difference between a search on the open
highway and a later search at the station."2 "8
The Coolidge Court was thus concerned only with circumstances that
would justify an initial intrusion, and in regard to this point the Court
said: "no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or
seizure absent 'exigent circumstances'."' '  Addressing the Carroll
exception of old, the Coolidge Court said, "The word 'automobile' is
not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away
and disappears." '3 0 Coolidge went further and clarified the open-view
doctrine as it applies to such cases: because the seizure of the
automobile in Coolidge was planned by the police before they arrived
at the actual scene of its seizure, the Court held that the requirement
that the seizure of an object in plain view not be "foreseeable" was not
met.3  However, if the initial seizure conformed to the requirements of
probable cause and exigent circumstances, the same Coolidge Court
would presumably allow a "foreseeable" warrantless search in a police
garage.
By again looking at the facts in Skinner, it is evident that under the
doctrines of Carroll and Chambers there was no difficulty in justifying
the warrantless seizure of the automobile from the open road. There
would also seem to have been little difficulty in upholding a warrantless
search in the police garage, had such an event occurred. But there are
two reasons for supporting the sound judgment of the police in taking
the time to procure a search warrant. The first is now of little note:
27. Id. at 461 n.18 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 463 n.20.
29. Id. at 468.
30. Id. at 461-62.
31. Id. at 464-66.
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each state court is free to adopt higher standards in regard to the fourth
amendment than set forth by the Supreme Court (as pointed out by the
Cooper Court 3 2 ). Because of the Skinner opinion it would appear that
this is not the case in Maryland. The second reason is still viable: every
time the police make a seizure they cannot be absolutely certain that
they have met the requirements of Carroll and Chambers, as interpreted
by the Skinner court. The fruits of such an unconstitutional warrantless
search would not be admissible as evidence. 3"
To establish the exact position of the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals in regard to the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement, two recent decisions by that court are helpful. In the first,
Peterson v. State,34 the-defendants were observed by police engaging in
activities related to the sale and possession of heroin while in an
automobile on the parking lot of a liquor store. In their appeal, the
defendants questioned the validity of a warrantless search of the vehicle
while still at the parking lot. The Peterson court held that the search
was constitutional, as exigent circumstances were present, unlike the
car in Coolidge, which it characterized as being in a "quiet haven
strikingly unlike the parking lot at bar.",3 5 However, if such a place
is in fact a "quiet haven," how could there be exigent circumstances
there? If an automobile is not mobile as the defendant and his family
are in police custody, on what grounds should a warrantless search be
justified? The second Maryland decision, Bailey v. State,3 6 answers
these questions.
In Bailey, the defendants' car was searched by the police at a
turnpike gas station in connection with an alleged rape. As in Skinner,
the probable cause for this initial search was furnished by a police
broadcast (there was a second warrantless search at the gas station some
hours after the first). Because it was unclear whether the defendants
were under arrest at the time of the initial search which produced
inculpatory evidence, the Bailey court applied the Carroll-Chambers
test of probable cause plus exigent circumstances and found the search
constitutional: 3 1 "The mere placing of a suspect vehicle's occupants in
custody does not extinguish exigency, if it otherwise exists." 3 8 Bailey
went on to cite many Maryland cases3 9 supporting what it considered
to be the Chambers theory of exigency, i.e. that once an automobile
has been secured constitutionally, the police may examine it at their
leisure and in a place of safety.4" It should be noted that the Bailey
32. 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
33. Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
34. 15 Md. App. 478, 292 A.2d 719 (1972).
35. Id. at 492, 292 A.2d at 723. Another distinction between the two cases is that Coolidge did
not involve contraband. See 403 U.S. at 472.
36. 16 Md. App. 83, 294 A.2d 123 (1972).
37. Id. at 103-04, 294 A.2d at 135.
38. Id. at 105, 294 A.2d at 135.
39. Id. at 105-06, 294 A.2d at 135-36.
40. Id. at 106, 294 A.2d at 136.
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court also imposed the Coolidge precondition that the search be
unforeseeable.4 1
In comparing the two prior Maryland cases to Skinner, it appears
that the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has attempted to comply
with the minimum requirements of the fourth amendment as set forth
by the Supreme Court. However, not all state courts have reached the
same conclusion in similar situations, particularly with regard to what
may be considered the Chambers view of exigency. 4 2 For example, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi recently held in Wolf v. State4"
(post-Coolidge) that the Chambers rationale made a search of a
defendant's automobile, after it had been removed to a police station,
constitutional. But unlike the court's dictum in Skinner,4 4  the
Mississippi court said:
The validity of continuing the search at the police parking lot
presents a close question and officers would make a mistake to
conclude that the warrant requirement no longer applies to
automobiles. The officer who makes a warrantless search when
there is time to obtain a search warrant takes a calculated risk
of having his efforts nullified by the suppression of evi-
dence .... Officers will be well advised to obtain a search
warrant whenever practical.
4 1
The Wolf court stated that the Chambers rule allowing warrantless
searches at the police station was being applied in that case only
because the time elapsed between a primary cursory search and the one
at the police station was brief, as in Chambers.4 6 The Skinner court did
not place this same emphasis when stating that there could be an
"immediate" warrantless search at the parking lot of the liquor
store.
4 7
In the Oklahoma case of Henry v. State4 1 the defendants were
arrested inside a laundromat after they parked their car outside.
Officers then directed them to drive to another location for
identification purposes. While there, the defendants' automobile was
left unattended for a few minutes before it was searched over protest.
The Henry court held that because the arrest in the laundromat was
illegal (due to lack of probable cause) inculpatory evidence found in the
car was inadmissible. The court also held that the automobile exception
41. Id. at 106-07, 294 A.2d at 136.
42. E.g., Henry v. State, 494 P.2d 661 (Okla. Crim. 1972); State v. Allen, 15 N.C. App. 695,
190 S.E.2d 719 (1972) (warrantless search at a police station under the hood of an automo-
bile held inadmissible). See also Wolf v. State, 260 So. 2d 425 (Miss. 1972).
43. 260.So. 2d 425 (Miss. 1972).
44. 16'Ma. App. at 118-19, 293 A.2d at 830-31 (1972).
45. 260 So. 2d 425, 431 (Miss. 1972) (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. 16 Md. App. at 119, 293 A.2d at 831 (1972).
48. 494 P.2d 661 (Okla. Crim. 1972).
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to the warrant requirement did not apply because there were no exigent
circumstances. The Oklahoma court gave a narrow interpretation of the
term "exigent circumstances," saying: "because the vehicle was subject
to being impounded at that time; and because there were sufficient
officers present to have controlled the situation ... there were no
unusual exigent circumstances existing at that moment."
4 9
Although the Oklahoma court is entitled to adopt this view of
exigent circumstances, it appears to be in conflict with authority such
as Bailey which holds that the fact that a defendant's vehicle is in
custody will not extinguish exigent circumstances." 0 The Henry court
rendered its interpretation of the automobile exception as set forth by
cases in the Supreme Court in that it made a direct comparison between
the facts before it and those of Coolidge.' 1 Henry did not delve
directly into the Chambers rule, but simply stated, "there is no merit,
in this jurisdiction, to the notion that a car may be searched without a
warrant simply because it is a moveable object."' 2
Most jurisdictions have, by means of the Chambers rationale,
extended exigent circumstances from the place of arrest or seizure to
the police garage.' ' In People v. Deutschman," ' a California court held
that a warrantless search in a police garage of the trunk of 'the
defendant's automobile was permissible. The court cites Dyke v. Taylor
Implement Mfg. Co.' s in support of the rule that only probable cause
is needed to make a warrantless search in such circumstances. The
simplistic view of the Deutschman court,6 which completely
overlooks the Chambers and Coolidge requirements of exigent
circumstances, may demonstrate how difficult it is to apply the logic of
courts which endeavor to extend the existence of exigent circumstances
to the police garage. This approach, however, would also seem to take
the California court in a direction that it cannot go: a shortcut past the
defendant's rights under the fourth amendment.
49. Id. at 664.
50. 16 Md. App. 83, 105, 294 A.2d 123, 135 (1972).
51. 494 P.2d 661 (Okla. Crim. 1972)..
52. Id. at 665.
53. E.g., Gonzales v. Beto, 460 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1972); State v. Tosatto, 107 Ariz. 231, 485
P.2d 556 (1971);, People v. Morehead, 6 Il. App. 3d 946, 287 N.E.2d 44 (1972). See also
Skinner v. State, 16 Md. App. 116, 293 A.2d 828 (1972).
54. 23 Cal. App. 3d 559, 100 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1972).
55. 391 U.S. 216 (1968). In Dyke a suspicious car was pursued in connection with a shooting
which involved several persons in a union dispute. While the occupants of the car were
being held in jail, a warrantless search was made of their car. The Supreme Court held that
the search was invalid because there was insufficient probable cause for the officers to have
believed that they would find contraband or other evidence of a crime. The Dyke Court
cited both Carroll and Cooper as support for the automobile exception to the warrant re-
quirement. Accordingly, the concept of probable cause is treated by Dyke only as a pre-
condition to and not as a substitute for the requirement of exigent circumstances.
56. The Deutschman court is not the only one to be confused about cases such as Coolidge.
The Coolidge Court itself said: "Of course, it would be nonsense to pretend that our deci-
sion today reduces Fourth Amendment law to complete order and harmony. The decisions




The present basis for allowing constitutional warrantless searches
where police have seized automobiles under exigent circumstances is
the Carroll automobile exception, as extended by the Chambers rule
allowing a warrantless search in a police garage. Most courts use a
strained construction of the term "exigent circumstances" to extend to
the situation in which police have taken an automobile to a place of
secure custody, and thus comply with the minimum requirements of
the fourth amendment as set forth by the Supreme Court. However,
some state courts prefer to adopt their own common sense
interpretation of exigent circumstances,' ' which they are entitled to
do as long as they do not impose further restrictions on a defendant's
rights as indicated by recent Supreme Court opinions."8
A further refinement of exigent circumstances may be forthcoming
from the United States Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombrowski, 9 a
case recently granted certiorari. In Cady the defendant (a policeman)
was arrested for drunken driving at the scene of a collision involving his
car. After this arrest, a warrantless search of the defendant's car,
including its trunk, was made for his missing service revolver.
Thereafter, the car was locked and towed to a police garage where a
second warrantless search produced evidence instrumental in the
defendant's conviction for murder.6 0 The United States Court of
Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that the second search
was unreasonable under the holding in Preston.
As discussed above, the defendant in Preston was arrested for
vagrancy, and the Court held that a warrantless search purportedly
incident thereto was unreasonable. Although the crime of drunken
driving appears to be in a class of crimes which is not serious enough
to justify a search for evidence, Cady and Preston are distinguishable.
One feature that sets Cady apart is the existence of a dangerous weapon
which might have threatened the safety of the arresting officers. It is
not clear whether this weapon provided an exigent circumstance which
would have justified its transfer to the later warrantless search in the
police garage. Even if the Supreme Court should hold that the second
search was justified, there is no certainty that this area of the search
and seizure law will become more predictable than it is at present.
In conclusion, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Skinner has
indicated that it would be willing to apply a construction to the term
57. Common sense is not limited to state courts. This approach was used in Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 366 (1964), which said: "Common sense dictates, of course, that
questions involving searches of motorcars or other things readily moved cannot be treated
identical to questions arising out of searches of fixed structures like houses."
58. 386 U.S. at 62.
59. Cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1972).
60. A warrantless search of another automobile parked on a farm belonging to the defendant's
brother also produced inculpatory evidence. The Court of Appeals held that the search of
this second vehicle was unconstitutional under the rule of Coolidge, as the police had prior
knowledge that they would find the car at the farm. The State is apparently not contesting
this part of the holding. See 11 CrIM. L. REP. 2290 (1972).
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"exigent circumstances" that would allow warrantless searches of cars
in police custody where such exigent circumstances were present at the
time of the initial seizure. However, the police should continue to
exercise care and caution and obtain a search warrant (as did the police
in the Skinner case), both for their own benefit in suppression hearings,
and for the protection of a defendant under the fourth amendment.
Frederick S. Lipton
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE-
SUNDAY BLUE LAWS HELD CONSTITUTIONAL. Giant of Maryland
v. State's Attorney for Prince George's County, _ Md. _, 298 A. 2d
427 (1973).
In Giant of Maryland v. State's Attorney for Prince George's
County' the Maryland Court of Appeals held that, in accordance with
Article 27, § 534H2 of the Maryland Code, a retail establishment may
not remain open on Sunday if, at any time in the course of its weekday
operating scheme, it employs more than six persons per shift.'
1. - Md __, 298 A.2d 427 (1973). Safeway Stores, Incorporated and the Grand Union Com-
pany were enjoined from operating on Sunday by identical petitions brought by the Prince
George's State's Attorney in the Court of Appeals of Maryland No. 149, September Term.
The appeals were separately argued, but the court chose to consolidate both into one opin-
ion because of their similarity of issues.
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 534H (1971). Insofar as pertinent to the issues presented in
Giant, this article provides:
(a) In Prince George's County, except as specifically in this section otherwise
provided, it is unlawful on Sunday for any wholesale or retail establishment to con-
duct business for labor or profit in the usual manner and location or to operate its
establishment in any manner for the general public. It shall not cause, direct, per-
mit, or authorize any employee or agent to engage in or conduct business on its be-
half on Sunday.
(b) Notwithstanding any provision of this section, the operation of any of the
following types of retail establishment is allowed on Sunday.
1. Drugstores whose principal business is the sale of drugs and related items.
2. Delicatessens whose principal business is the sale of delicatessens and re-
lated food items.
3. Bakeries and bakeshops.
(c) Nothing in this section applies to:
3. Small business with not more than six (6) persons on any shift with the ex-
ception of persons or retailers engaged in the sale of motor vehicles.
The statute further authorizes the Circuit Court to enjoin violation of this section and
provides for misdemeanor penalties of one thousand dollars per employee directed to
operate in violation thereof.
3. The Blue Laws of Maryland are found in MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 492-534M. Section
534H, which governs Sunday sales in Prince George's County, is similar to those sections
operative in Montgomery (id. § 534J), Baltimore (id. § 534L), Harford and Wicomico (id.
§ 534M) Counties. Section 534J is identical except that it contains the word "basic" in
subsection (b)(1), while § 534H(b)(1) uses the word "principal". Section 534L is nearly
